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The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) is vested
with broad power to investigate violations of the federal securities laws.' The
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Georgetown University (1980).
1. See, e.g., SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien , Ine., - U.S. -_, 104 S. Ct. 2720, 2725 (1984)
(SEC not required to give "target" of its investigation notice of subpoenas issued to third par-
ties); SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d 1018, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (investigation into
possible violations of securities laws, which was predicated on preliminary indication of false
or misleading statements in materials filed with SEC, was not unreasonable), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1071 (1979). The main statutory source of the Commission's investigatory authority is found
in § 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), which provides:
The Commission may, in its discretion, make such investigations as it deems necessary
to determine whether any person has violated, is violating, or is about to violate any
provision of this chapter, the rules or regulations thereunder, the rules of a national
securities exchange or registered securities association of which such person is a member
or a person associated with a member, the rules of a registered clearing agency in which
such person is a participant, or the rules of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board,
and may require or permit any person to file with it a statement in writing, under
oath or otherwise as the Commission shall determine, as to all the facts and circumstances
concerning the matter to be investigated. The Commission is authorized in its discre-
tion, to publish information concerning any such violations, and to investigate any
facts, conditions, practices, or matters which it may deem necessary or proper to aid
in the enforcement of such provisions, in the prescribing of rules and regulations under
this chapter, or in securing information to serve as a basis for recommending further
legislation concerning the matters to which this chapter relates.
15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1982). Section 20(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) similarly
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:895
power is analogous to that of grand juries to investigate criminal violations.2
Like the grand jury, the Commission's Division of Enforcement conducts its
investigations in secret.3 Consequently, during the investigation a target
generally cannot discover what, if any, evidence the Commission has
accumulated against him.
One of the most important weapons in the Commission's investigatory
arsenal is the power to compel testimony of witnesses and production of
documents. 4 There are few restrictions on the Commission's subpoena power,5
which is likewise comparable to that of a federal grand jury. 6 Although an
SEC subpoena is not self-enforcing, 7 the Commission may obtain judicial
enforcement of a subpoena if it is within the authority of the agency to issue
the subpoena, the demand for information is not too indefinite, and the
information sought is relevant to the investigation. 9 Once the Commission
provides that the Commission may investigate "[w]henever it shall appear to the Commission,
either upon complaint or otherwise, that the provisions of this subchapter, or of any rule or
regulation proscribed under authority thereof, have been or are about to be violated...." 15
U.S.C. § 77t(a) (1982).
2. See SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d 1018, 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (administrative
agency power of inquisition is analogous to grand jury), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1071 (1979); SEC
v. Kaplan, 397 F. Supp. 564, 569 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (SEC as fact-finding institution performs
function similar to grand jury); United States v. Kline, 366 F. Supp. 994, 998 (D.D.C. 1973)
(SEC has broad investigatory functions analogous to grand jury). See generally United States
v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950) (inquistorial function of administrative agen-
cies resembles that of grand jury).
3. Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, with certain limited
exceptions, grand jury proceedings are to be kept secret. FED. R. CalM. P. 6(e)(2). Similarly,
the Code of Federal Regulations provides that "[u]nless otherwise ordered by the Commission,
all formal investigative proceedings shall be non-public." 17 C.F.R. § 203.5 (1984).
4. Section 21(b) of the Exchange Act provides:
For the purpose of any such investigation, or any other proceeding under this chapter,
any member of the Commission or any officer designated by it is empowered to administer
oaths and affirmations, subpena[sic] witnesses, compel their attendance, take evidence,
and require the production of any books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, or other
records which the Commission deems relevant or material to the inquiry. Such atten-
dance of witnesses and the production of any such records may be required from any
place in the United States or any State at any designated place of hearing.
15 U.S.C. § 78u(b) (1982).
5. See SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 2720, 2726 (1984) ("The
provisions vesting the SEC with the power to issue and seek enforcement of subpoenas are
expansive.").
6. See supra note 2 (cases cited).
7. See, e.g., SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., __ U.S. __ , 104S. Ct. 2720, 2725 (1984).
8. Id. The statutory authority for the Commission to bring a subpoena enforcement action
is found in § 21(c) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(c) (1982), and in § 22(b) of the Securities
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77v(b) (1982).
9. See, e.g., SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d 1018, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (enforc-
ing subpoena demanding 14 different categories of documents covering six-year period and per-
taining to 29 individuals and entities, for all officers and directors of SEC's target and to special
engagements, projects or management consulting services performed by Arthur Young for target),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1071 (1979); SEC v. Kaplan, 397 F. Supp. 564, 568 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (en-
forcing subpoena demanding eight categories of documents pertaining to witness' investments,
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makes this relatively easy showing, the burden shifts to the recipient of the
subpoena to show that the subpoena is unreasonable, was issued in bad faith,
or the like.'" The burden on the recipient is a heavy one," and the courts
have generally been unwilling to quash subpoenas. 2
One of the few means that the recipient of a subpoena has to resist the
Commission's subpoena power is the self-incrimination clause of the fifth
amendment. Because the federal securities laws provide for criminal as well
as civil penalties for their violation,' 3 a witness who testifies or produces
documents in an SEC investigation thereby takes the risk that his testimony
or documents may be used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution.
Thus, it is well established that a witness may invoke the fifth amendment
loans, bank accounts and real estate transactions). Whether a subpoena is relevant to the in-
vestigation is determined by reference to the Non-Public Formal Order of Investigation that the
Commission issues when it authorizes an investigation. A copy of the formal order can be obtained
by anyone who is required to testify in the investigation. See 17 C.F.R. § 203.7(a) (1984) (Rule
7, SEC Rules Relating to Investigations).
10. Kaplan, 397 F. Supp. at 571. See SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib. Co., 480 F.2d
1047, 1056 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974); SEC v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel
Corp., 482 F. Supp. 555, 563 (W.D. Pa. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 648 F.2d 118 (3d
Cir. 1981).
11. SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib. Co., 480 F.2d 1047, 1056 (2d Cir. 1973) ("the burden
of showing that an agency subpoena is unreasonable remains with the respondent and where,
as here, the agency inquiry is authorized by law and the materials sought are relevant ....
that burden is not easily met") (allegation that disclosure of financial reports and financier iden-
tities would possibly damage business does not sustain burden), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974).
12. The two leading cases in which the Commission's authority to enforce a subpoena was
limited as a result of misconduct are SEC v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 648 F.2d 118 (3d
Cir. 1981), and SEC v. ESM Gov't Sec., Inc., 645 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981). In Wheeling-Pittsburgh,
the district court had denied enforcement of an SEC subpoena because of improper interference
with the SEC investigation by United States Senator Lowell Weicker on behalf of an acknowledged
competitor of Wheeling-Pittsburgh for no legitimate purpose. The Third Circuit, in remanding
for further discovery, stated that the district court could refuse to enforce the subpoena if it
found that the Commission was acting in bad faith. 648 F.2d at 126. In ESM Government Securities,
Inc., the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's decision enforcing an SEC sub-
poena. The Fifth Circuit held that fraud, deceit, or trickery by SEC investigators are grounds
for denying enforcement of an administrative subpoena. 645 F.2d at 317. See also Hunt v. United
States Sec. & Exchange Comn'n, 520 F. Supp. 580, 610 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (defendants granted
injunction against SEC from future violations of Right to Financial Privacy Act in connection
with SEC's investigation of Hunt brothers).
13. Section 32(a) of the Exchange Act provides:
Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter (other than section
78dd-1 of this title), or any rule or regulation thereunder the violation of which is
made unlawful or the observance of which is required under the terms of this chapter,
or any person who willfully and knowingly makes, or causes to be made, any statement
in any application, report, or document required to be filed under this chapter or any
rule or regulation thereunder or any undertaking contained in a fegistration statement
as provided in subsection (d) of section 15 of this chapter or by any self-regulatory
organization in connection with an application for membership or participation therein
or to become associated with a member thereof which statement was false or misleading
with respect to any material fact, shall upon conviction be fined not more than $10,000,
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, except that when such person is an
1984]
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privilege in response to an SEC subpoena for testimony or production of
documents.'
4
The protection offered by the privilege is not unlimited, however. The
privilege is available only to individuals and sole proprietorships, and not to
corporations, partnerships, or other similar entities.S Nor does the privilege
provide complete protection even for individuals. To assert the privilege suc-
cessfully, an individual must show that the SEC subpoena in fact compels
him to make a self-incriminating, testimonial communication.' This burden
can be difficult, especially in the case of subpoenas duces tecum, because recent
Supreme Court decisions have drastically cut back the scope of fifth amend-
ment protection for documents.'"
If the fifth amendment privilege is available, it unquestionably provides
a powerful tool for the witness in an SEC investigation. Not only does it pro-
tect the witness from self-incriminating disclosures, but it also prevents the
Commission from making its case out of the witness' own mouth. By assert-
ing the privilege during the investigation, the witness gains the advantage of
not having to testify at a time when he does not know the nature and extent
of the Commission's evidence against him. If, after concluding its investiga-
tion, the Commission decides to bring a civil injunctive action against the
witness, he can obtain discovery of the Commission's evidence (such as
documents produced to the Commission and transcripts of testimony taken
from witnesses during the investigation) prior to being deposed. The primary
disadvantage of this course of action is the possibility that the Commission
will successfully seek to have the trier of fact draw an adverse inference in
the civil action from the invocation of the privilege." However, as will be
shown, no such adverse inference can be drawn from a witness' assertion of
his fifth amendment rights during an SEC investigation. 19
exchange, a fine not exceeding $500,000 may be imposed; but no person shall be sub-
ject to imprisonment under this section for the violation of any rule or regulation if
he proves that he had no knowledge of such rule or regulation.
15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1982).
Section 32(c) of the Exchange Act provides for fines of up to one million dollars for corporations
that violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and for imprisonment of up to five years and
fines of up to ten thousand dollars for officers, directors, or stockholders who violate the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c) (1982). Other criminal provisions of the federal securities
laws include § 24 of the Securities Act, which provides for imprisonment of not more than five
years and fines of not more than ten thousand dollars for any willful violation of the Securities
Act or any rule promulgated thereunder. 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1982).
14. See, e.g., SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); SEC v. Scott, 565
F. Supp. 1513, 1533 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), affdper curiam sub nom, SEC v. Cayman Islands Reins.
Corp., 734 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1984). See generally Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York
Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964) (White, J., concurring) ("[t]he privilege can be claimed in any
proceeding, be it criminal or civil, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory").
15. See infra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 62-125 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 182-97 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 198-214 and accompanying text.
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Even if the adverse inference is unavailable to the Commission, counsel
must consider other potential disadvantages of invoking the privilege before
advising his client to do so. In certain cases, invoking the privilege may have
adverse collateral consequences for the witness.2" Moreover, asserting the
privilege will unquestionably lead the staff of the Division of Enforcement
to believe that the witness has in fact violated the securities laws. When seek-
ing authority to bring an enforcement action, the staff will undoubtedly rely
in part on the witness' assertion of the privilege. As is discussed below, whether
these risks outweigh the benefits of invoking the fifth amendment will vary
from case to case.
This article analyzes the use of the fifth amendment in SEC investiga-
tions. Part I of the article discusses the scope of the fifth amendment in light
of recent Supreme Court decisions. 2 Part II of the article discusses the
advisability of invoking the fifth amendment in those cases where it is available,
with particular emphasis on the question of the potential adverse inference. 22
Part III contains a suggested procedure for asserting the fifth amendment in
an SEC investigation.
23
I. Tim ScoPE oF Tm Fir AmEND1MNT
The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." 2 The privilege created
by the fifth amendment prohibits the government from compelling a person
to make a testimonial communication that incriminates him.25 Although the
privilege has existed in this country since the adoption of the Bill of Rights,
its boundaries are still not completely clear, and questions as to its scope are
frequently litigated. In recent years, the courts have focused on three issues
of particular interest to attorneys representing witnesses in SEC investigations:
(a) whether documents are held in a personal capacity (and are therefore poten-
tially privileged) or a representative capacity (and are therefore not privileged);
(b) whether documents held in a personal capacity are in fact privileged; and
(c) whether a particular oral statement or document is incriminating. What
follows is a discussion of each of these issues.
A. Determining Whether Documents Are Personal
The fifth amendment privilege is generally available only to natural per-
20. See infra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 24-177 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 178-214 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 215-18 and accompanying text.
24. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
25. See United States v. Schlansky, 709 F.2d 1079, 1083 (6th Cir. 1983) (elements of fifth
amendment privilege are "(1) compulsion, (2) testimonial communication, (3) incrmiination by
such communication"), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 1591 (1984); Note, On Claiming
The Fifth Amendment For Mixed Purpose Documents: The Problem of Categorizing Documents
As Personal Or Corporate In A Business Setting, 17 U.S.F.L.qRv. 333, 335 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as Mixed Purpose Documents].
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sons, and not to "collective entit[ies]." 21 Thus, neither a corporation, 2 nor
a partnership, 28 nor a labor union2 9 may assert the privilege, and a corporate
officer, partner, or union official must produce documents he holds for the
organization in a representative capacity, even if they incriminate him." On
the other hand, a sole proprietorship, which has no legal existence separate
from that of the proprietor, is protected by the privilege on the theory that
the sole proprietor holds the documents of the proprietorship in a personal
capacity.31 This produces the somewhat anomalous result that a one-person
corporation does not possess the privilege,32 while a sole proprietorship with
a hundred employees does.
33
The distinction between individuals and sole proprietorships on the one
hand and "collective entities" on the other, while conceptually simple, can
be difficult to apply in practice .3 For example, a number of decisions have
considered whether diaries, calendars, and appointment books maintained by
corporate officials are personal documents (and therefore within the privilege)
or corporate documents (and therefore unprotected). 31 In one case the assis-
tant treasurer of a corporation was held in contempt for refusing to produce
desk calendars and pocket calendars in response to a grand jury subpoena
after the district court had determined these items to be corporate rather than
personal. 3' The Second Circuit examined the subpoenaed documents, but could
not determine whether the entries were corporate or personal in nature."1
Accordingly, it remanded to the district court for further factual findings.3
The appellate court suggested that the lower court should examine the nature
of the contents of the documents, their purpose, who prepared them, who
had custody of them, who had access to them, and whether the corporation
required their preparation or needed them to conduct its business. 9
26. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 88 (1974).
27. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
28. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
29. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
30. See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 385 (1911). The witness cannot, however,
be compelled to testify as to the whereabouts of records he has not produced if such testimony
would incriminate him. Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957).
31. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. at 87-88. See United States v. Doe, - U.S. -,
104 S. Ct. 1237, 1241 (1984) (upholding assertion of privilege by sole proprietorship).
32. Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74, 80 (1913).
33. In re Oswalt, 607 F.2d 645, 647 (5th Cir. 1979).
34. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated April 23, 1981, 522 F. Supp. 977,
980 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); see also United States v. Malis, 737 F.2d 1511, 1512-13 (9th Cir. 1984)
(district court enforced IRS summons for records of partnership; Ninth Circuit reversed and
remanded for evidentiary hearing on taxpayer's claim that records were really those of sole pro-
prietorship since wife was at most nominal partner and partnership form was used only for tax
reporting purposes).
35. See Mixed Purpose Documents, supra note 25, at 345-53 (collection of cases).
36. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated April 23, 1981, 657 F.2d 5, 7
(2d Cir. 1981).
37. Id. at 8.
38. Id. at 9.
39. Id. at 8.
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On remand, the district court determined that the desk calendars were
corporate documents4" but that the pocket diaries were not.4 The district court
observed that, although the desk calendars contained some personal notations,
most pertained to corporate matters and the calendars were used primarily
for corporate business. 42 The corporation supplied the calendars, and they
were left open on the witness' desk, where the witness' secretary had access
to them. 3 By contrast, the district court found that the pocket diaries con-
tained more personal entries than the desk calendars." Moreover, the witness
kept the diaries on his person, and only he had access to them.4 The witness
did not obtain the diaries from the corporation, but rather received them as
gifts from third parties or purchased them himself.
46
In a similar case, the Ninth Circuit upheld a subpoena seeking a desk
calendar used by the vice-president of a company but also ordered production
of the vice-president's Brooks Brothers diary. 47 The court reasoned that the
documents were corporate because the vice-president kept them in his office
and used them to record business meetings and corporate transactions. 48 The
fact that he also made some personal notations in the documents was deemed
insufficient to bring the calendar and diary within the privilege.4 9 By contrast,
the First Circuit held that a doctor's appointment log was personal, even though
the log was maintained in an office at the hospital-corporation, of which the
doctor was the Chairman of the Board, by a secretary whose salary was paid
by the hospital. 50 In support of its holding, the court pointed to the fact that
the log dealt primarily with payments by the doctor's own patients. 51
Deciding whether a document is the individual corporate officer's or the
corporation's is particularly important in an SEC investigation since only the
former are even potentially privileged. Therefore, before any decision can be
made concerning production, the personal documents must be separated from
those that are corporate officers' business records. Making the decision can
be difficult since the personal documents of a corporate officer are often kept
in the corporate offices. When smaller companies are involved, this distinc-
tion is even more difficult to make because officials of such companies fre-
quently fail to differentiate their personal activities from those of the com-
pany. Consequently, these officials typically commingle personal and corporate
documents. In separating business and personal documents, the criteria listed
40. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated April 23, 1981, 522 F. Supp. 977,
982 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
41. Id. at 984.
42. Id. at 982-83.
43. Id. at 983.
44. Id. at 984.
45. Id. at 985.
46. Id.
47. United States v. MacKey, 647 F.2d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 1981).
48. Id. at 901.
49. Id.
50. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Martinez), 626 F.2d 1051, 1053-54 (Ist Cir. 1980).
51. Id. at 1054.
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by the Second Circuit 52 may be of some use, although as that court properly
recognized, these criteria are not exhaustive. 3 Whatever criteria counsel
ultimately uses, he must apply them consistently and be prepared to defend
them in a principled manner.
Where the corporation and the individuals are separately represented, it
is important for counsel, prior to responding to the subpoena, to draw the
distinction between corporate and personal documents. Counsel for the
individual corporate officer should only be involved with the production of
documents which are truly personal and, therefore, potentially privileged.
Counsel representing the issuer should be responsible for producing documents
from the individual officer's corporate files.
B. Determining Whether Personal Documents Are Privileged
In recent years, courts have struggled with the question of whether pro-
duction of personal documents in response to a subpoena constitutes a com-
pelled testimonial communication for purposes of the fifth amendment. The
Supreme Court has decided two major cases on the issue in recent years,54
and the lower courts have handed down a host of opinions attempting to
amplify and to reconcile the rulings of the Justices."
The traditional view of the scope of fifth amendment protection for
documents was set forth by Mr. Justice Bradley, writing for the Supreme Court
in Boyd v. United States. 6 In Boyd, the Court held that compulsory produc-
tion of an individual's "private books and papers" violated the fifth
amendment.5 7 In determining whether documents were privileged, Boyd focused
on their contents.5 If their contents were "private," the government could
not order their production any more than it could force an individual to testify
as to his "private" thoughts. 59 The statements contained in a person's private
papers constituted testimonial communications within the fifth amendment,
and the forced disclosure of those statements pursuant to a subpoena satisfied
the requirement of compulsion.
Over the next ninety years, the Supreme Court continued to rely on Boyd
and to espouse the view that the fifth amendment protects the privacy interests
52. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (Second Circuit's criteria).
53. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated April 23, 1981, 657 F.2d 5, 8 (2d
Cir. 1981).
54. See United States v. Doe, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 1237 (1984); Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
55. See generally Note, The Rights of Criminal Defendants and the Subpoena Duces Tecum:
The Aftermath of Fisher v. United States, 95 HAv. L. REv. 683 (1982), and cases cited therein
[hereinafter cited as Aftermath of Fisher].
56. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
57. Id. at 634-35.
58. Aftermath of Fisher, supra note 55, at 684 (under Boyd, courts "focus[ed] on the nature
of the evidence sought, not the process by which it was to be obtained").
59. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623.
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of the individual. 6 As late as 1976, Mr. Justice Brennan could observe that
Boyd's holding had "often been reiterated without question. ' 61 In that year,
however, the Supreme Court decided Fisher v. United States, 2 a case that
drastically altered analysis of fifth amendment issues63 and reduced the degree
of fifth amendment protection for documents. 6 In Fisher, a taxpayer under
investigation by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) obtained from his accoun-
tant certain workpapers that the accountant had used in preparing the tax-
payer's returns. 6- The taxpayer turned the workpapers over to the attorney
who was representing him in the IRS investigation.66 The IRS issued a sum-
mons to the attorney seeking production of the workpapers. 67 The attorney
refused to comply with the summons, and the government brought a civil ac-
tion to enforce it.
68
The Supreme Court concluded that the workpapers should be produced.
69
Because the summons was directed to the attorney and not the taxpayer, the
Court held that the summons did not compel the taxpayer to do anything
and, therefore, did not violate the fifth amendment. 7 The Court rejected the
contention that the attorney's obligation to preserve the confidences of his
client created a reasonable expectation of privacy in the client that was pro-
tected by the fifth amendment. 7' The opinion conceded that the protection
of privacy was one of several goals served by the fifth amendment."2 The Court,
however, made clear that only invasions of privacy that involved compelled
testimonial incrimination of some sort violated the privilege. 73
The Court went on to state that, if the documents would have been pro-
tected by the fifth amendment in the hands of the taxpayer and if the tax-
payer transferred them to his attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice,
then the documents would be protected by the attorney-client privilege.7
4
Applying this principle, the Court held that a summons directing the taxpayer
to produce his accountant's workpapers did not violate the fifth amendment75
60. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 419 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judg-
ment) (citing cases).
61. Id.
62. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
63. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
64. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served Upon John Doe, 466 F. Supp.
325, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (Fisher "cut back significantly on the ability of one under subpoena
to restrict Government access to documents in one's possession").
65. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 394.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 395.
69. Id. at 396.
70. Id. at 397.
71. Id. at 399.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 405.
75. Id. at 409.
1984]
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because such a subpoena did not compel the taxpayer to testify orally or to
restate or affirm the contents of the subpoenaed documents.16 The Court
observed that the workpapers were not prepared by the taxpayer and thus
contained no testimonial declarations by him." Moreover, because the
workpapers had been voluntarily prepared, any testimonial declarations that
they contained could not be considered compelled.7 8 Thus, even though the
documents were incriminating, they were not protected by the fifth
amendment.
9
The Court next considered whether the act of producing the documents,
which the Court conceded was compelled, constituted a testimonial
communication.80 The Justices noted that, by producing the documents, the
taxpayer tacitly conceded their existence, his possession of them, and his belief
that the documents were those described in the subpoena. 8' The Court con-
cluded, however, that the production of the workpapers did not violate the
fifth amendment since their existence and location were already known to the
government. 2 Nor, in the Court's view, could the taxpayer be deemed to have
implicitly authenticated the workpapers by producing them.8 3 The Court
reasoned that the taxpayer could not authenticate the workpapers since he
had not prepared them and could not otherwise vouch for their accuracy. 4
Fisher thus shifted the focus of fifth amendment inquiry away from the
contents of the documents to the act of production. 5 Although the Court
did not overrule Boyd,8 6 the Justices cut back on Boyd by de-emphasizing
the notion that the fifth amendment was designed to protect the privacy of
the individual. 7 Indeed, the opinion cast doubt on whether private papers
were even within the privilege.
88
Mr. Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment of the Court in Fisher,
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 409-10.
79. Id. at 409.
80. See id. at 410.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 411.
83. Id. at 412-13.
84. Id. at 413.
85. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served Upon John Doe, 466 F. Supp.
325, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("the Court [in Fisher] has directed us to look beyond the contents
of the document sought as had always been the inquiry, and toward the testimonial elements
of production in determining whether or not the Fifth Amendment privilege exists"); accord
United States v. Schlansky, 709 F.2d 1079, 1082 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, - U.S. -,
104 S. Ct. 1591 (1984); Hafetz, Document Subpoenas and Fifth Amendment Privilege: Case Law
Development in HArTz, ADVANCED WroM CouR CRuiNAL PRA C cE 14-15 (1983).
86. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 414 (reserving question of whether fifth amendment would pro-
tect taxpayer from producing his own tax records on ground that workpapers sought in Fisher
were not "private papers").
87. See id. at 409.
88. See id. ("the prohibition against forcing the production of private papers has long been
a rule searching for a rationale").
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but refused to join its opinion on the grounds that it denigrated the privacy
principle of Boyd.8 9 Reviewing the history of the privilege and the Court's
previous decisions construing it, he concluded that one of the primary pur-
poses of the privilege was to protect personal privacy. 90 In Brennan's view,
testimonial communications included not only an individual's immediate
declarations, whether oral or written, but also his books and papers,9' including
diaries, letters, and "nonbusiness economic records" such as cancelled checks
or tax records. 92 Justice Brennan also took the position, consistent with Bellis
v. United States,93 that the business records of a sole proprietorship were within
the privilege. 94
Given the tension between the Justices' opinions in Fisher and the fact
that the majority opinion criticized Boyd without overruling it, it was not sur-
prising that the lower courts differed greatly on the meaning of Fisher." The
First Circuit, for example, held that Fisher had stripped the content of business
records of any fifth amendment protection and that such documents were
privileged only if the act of production would serve to authenticate them. 96
In United States v. Beattie,97 the Second Circuit likewise adopted the "implicit
authentication" rationale of Fisher, but did not reach the question of whether
the fifth amendment continued to protect the contents of documents. 98 The
court went on to hold that a letter written by a taxpayer to his accountant,
and subsequently retrieved by the taxpayer, was privileged. 99 Other lower courts,
following Justice Brennan's lead, held that even after Fisher the privilege barred
a subpoena for an individual's private papers.' In In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings (Johanson),101 for example, the Third Circuit held that personal
appointment books that the witness kept on his person and in which only
he wrote were private papers under the fifth amendment.1 2 Reaffirming the
89. Id. at 414 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
90. Id. at 416.
91. Id. at 418.
92. Id. at 427.
93. 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
94. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 425-27 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); see Bellis, 417
U.S. at 87-88.
95. See Aftermath of Fisher, supra note 55, at 685 (uncertainty generated by Fisher has
confused lower courts).
96. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Martinez), 626 F.2d 1051, 1055 (1st Cir. 1980). Apply-
ing this standard, the court held that the records at issue, logs prepared by the doctor-witness'
secretary reflecting appointments with patients and payments, were within the privilege. Id. at
1055-56.
97. 541 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
98. See id. at 331.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Empanelled March 19, 1980, 680 F.2d 327, 333 (3d Cir.
1982), rev'd sub nom., United States v. Doe, __ U.S. - , 104 S. Ct. 1237 (1984); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 601 F.2d 162, 168 (5th Cir. 1979); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum
Dated April 23, 1981, 522 F. Supp. 977, 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
101. 632 F.2d 1033 (3d Cir. 1980).
102. Id. at 1042, 1044.
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vitality of Boyd, the court reasoned that the fifth amendment created an in-
violable "zone of privacy" around the citizen. 103 A contrary result, the court
believed, might well lead citizens to refrain from reducing their thoughts to
writing, out of a fear that their writings could subsequently be used to in-
criminate them."'
Consistent with Justice Brennan's position that the fifth amendment pro-
tected the business records of sole proprietorships, the Fifth Circuit, in In
re Grand Jury Proceedings (McCoy and Sussman),"10 refused to enforce a sub-
poena to a sole proprietor seeking, among other things, financial statements
and workpapers used to prepare them, ledgers, check requests, records of
receipts and disbursements, vouchers, bills, invoices, and payroll records.'
0 6
The court reasoned that the subpoenaed documents were "personal financial
records" and, therefore, did not have to be produced." 7 Similarly, the Third
Circuit held in In re Grand Jury Empanelled March 19, 1980,108 that the fifth
amendment still protected private papers and that this protection extended
not only to an individual's personal records, but also to the business papers
of an individual or a sole proprietorship.0 9 Applying this principle, the court
then quashed five subpoenas directing the witness to produce numerous
documents relating to his sole proprietorships, including correspondence, bank
statements, checks, deposit tickets, telephone toll records, ledgers, vouchers,
invoices, contracts, purchase orders, bids, financial statements, and income
tax returns. 10 The court went on to hold that, even if the subpoenaed
documents were not private papers, they were nevertheless privileged under
Fisher, since the very act of producing them would constitute an admission
of their existence and their possession by the taxpayer."' The court observed
that the record contained no indication that the government actually knew
that the subpoenaed documents existed or were in the possession of the
witness." 2 To compel their production under such circumstances, the court
reasoned, would violate the fifth amendment by making the witness "the
primary informant against himself.""' 3
In United States v. Doe, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed
103. Id. at 1043.
104. Id.
105. 601 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1979).
106. See id. at 166-67.
107. Id. at 170.
108. 680 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom., United States v. Doe, - U.S. -,
104 S. Ct. 1237 (1984).
109. Id. at 333-34.
110. Id. at 328-29 & n.2.
111. Id. at 334-35.
112. Id. at 335.
113. Id. The Third Circuit also stated that, by producing the subpoenaed documents, the
witness would be forced to authenticate them. Id. The court noted that many of the subpoenaed
documents, including ledgers, contracts, correspondence, and memoranda, were most likely prepared
by the witness and that the government had failed to offer any explanation as to how such documents
could be authenticated except by the witness. Id.
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in part, and remanded." 4 Relying heavily on the reasoning of Fisher, the Court
overturned the Third Circuit's holding that the documents at issue were private
papers and, therefore, within the fifth amendment privilege." 5 The Court em-
phasized that, because the documents had been voluntarily prepared, the
statements they contained were not compelled for purposes of the fifth
amendment." 6 In the Court's view, the fact that the documents were in the
possession of the witness (rather than his attorney, as had been the case in
Fisher) was irrelevant to determining whether the creation of the documents
was compelled. "' Accordingly, the Court concluded that there was no fifth
amendment protection for the contents of the documents." 8
However, the Supreme Court did affirm the Third Circuit's holding that
the act of producing the documents at issue violated the privilege.' 9 Again
relying on Fisher, the Court opined that a subpoena for documents compels
the witness to perform an act, i.e., turning the documents over to the govern-
ment, that may have testimonial aspects and an incriminating effect.' 20 The
Court placed great weight on the findings of the district court (which had
been affirmed by the Third Circuit) that producing the documents would admit
their existence and authenticity, as well as the witness' possession of them.12'
Having determined the limits of the privilege, the Court turned to the ques-
tion of use immunity. It rejected the government's proposed doctrine of con-
structive use immunity, whereby the district court would order the witness
to produce the subpoenaed documents and, at the same time, order the govern-
ment not to use the act of production against the witness in any way.' 22 The
Supreme Court stated that, in the absence of a formal request for immunity
under 18 U.S.C. § 6003, courts lacked jurisdiction to grant prospective use
immunity.' 2 ' The Court did state, however, that if the Department of Justice
did obtain immunity pursuant to the statute, it extended only to the act of
producing the documents subpoenaed, and not to their contents.' 2 The Court
reasoned that the immunity statute was coextensive with the fifth amendment
114. United States v. Doe, - U.S. - , 104 S. Ct. 1237, 1245 (1984).
115. See id. at 1241-42.
116. Id. at 1241.
117. Id. at 1242.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1242-43.
120. Id. at 1242.
121. See id. at 1242-43 & nn.11, 12. The Court rejected the government's argument that
the incriminating effect of the act of production would be so trivial as to avoid impinging upon
the privilege. Id. at 1243 n.13. The Court stated that the witness' allegations that producing the
documents would admit their existence, their authenticity, and his possession of them were suffi-
cient to establish a substantial and real risk of incrimination. Id. According to the Justices, the
government could theoretically prevent this showing by introducing evidence that possession, ex-
istence, and authentication were foregone conclusions but the government had failed to make
such a showing in the present case. Id.
122. See id. at 1244.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1244 n.17.
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and that, since the fifth amendment provided no protection for the contents
of documents, the immunity statute did not either.'
Even though Fisher and Doe have substantially narrowed the scope of
fifth amendment protection for documents, these decisions may nonetheless
permit a witness in an SEC investigation to withhold documents if the act
of production would be tantamount to testimony regarding their existence and
the witness' possession of them. Particularly in the early stages of an SEC
investigation, the subpoenas issued by the Commission are very broadly worded.
Typically, the subpoenas seek all bank statements, checks, and deposit slips
or all documents reflecting brokerage accounts for a particular period. Sub-
poenas also frequently request all diaries, calendars, and appointment books
and all telephone logs. Such broadly worded requests suggest that the Com-
mission is not aware of the existence of any particular documents requested
by the subpoena, but rather is merely engaged in a fishing expedition for
documents of the type commonly kept by corporate officers or by individuals
who trade in the stock market. Under Fisher and Doe, the act of producing
documents in response to such a subpoena would clearly have testimonial
aspects and, therefore, would be within the privilege against
self-incrimination.
126
Furthermore, an SEC subpoena may be resisted under the implicit authen-
tication theory of Fisher if the act of production would require the witness
to admit the genuineness of the documents sought.' 7 The implicit authentica-
tion theory protects documents written by the witness'28 and any documents
created by third parties if their production would constitute an admission that
125. See id.
126. See, e.g., United States v. Fox, 721 F.2d 32, 38 (2d Cir. 1983) (IRS summons quashed;
"the mere fact that a tax return reveals on its face that a taxpayer had 'at least one bank account'
or 'brokerage account' does not give the IRS any information about whether the taxpayer has
records of other bank accounts showing income that was never reported in his return"); In re
Grand Jury Empanelled March 19, 1980, 680 F.2d 327, 335 (3d Cir. 1982) (quashing subpoena
for all books and records, including inter alia, ledgers, journals, vouchers, bank statements, checks,
and contracts; "The most plausible inference to be drawn from the broad-sweeping subpoenas
is that the Government, unable to prove that the subpoenaed documents exist ... is attempting
to compensate for its lack of knowledge by requiring the appellee to become, in effect, the primary
informant against himself"), aff'd on thispoint sub nom., United States v. Doe, - U.S. -,
104 S. Ct. 1237, 1243 (1984); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served Upon John Doe,
466 F. Supp. 325, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (quashing subpoena directed to target suspected of illegal
payments to union officials seeking all records of any kind received from certain individuals;
"the existence of the documents in question is not, as in Fisher, a 'foregone conclusion' "); cf.
United States v. Schlansky, 709 F.2d 1079, 1083 (6th Cir. 1983) (enforcing IRS summons for
ring binder containing 8" x 12" sheets to which were attached checks, bank statements, invoices,
receipts, and workpapers for 1976 and 1977), cert. denied, - U.S. - , 104 S. Ct. 428 (1984).
127. See 5J. WEINsTEIN & M. BERGER, WEIN s EIN's EVIDENCE 901(a)[01] (1983) (authen-
tication is process by which evidence is shown to be genuine, i.e., what its proponent claims it to be).
128. See United States v. Beattie, 541 F.2d 329, 331 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam) ("By pro-
ducing his own letters to the accountant, the taxpayer would be authenticating them .... ITihe
Fifth Amendment protects against compulsory production of a paper written by an accused with
respect to his own affairs").
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they are in fact the witness' records and that they pertain to him. 29 Under
this theory, a witness in an SEC investigation can refuse to produce not only
correspondence and other documents created by him, but also his bank
statements, checks, and brokerage account records." '
C. Standard for Witnesses Seeking to Invoke the Privilege
In Hoffman v. United States,'3' the Supreme Court laid down the stan-
dard for determining whether a witness' response to a subpoena for testimony
or documents will incriminate him. Under this test, a witness is entitled to
the privilege's protection when there is "reasonable cause to apprehend danger
from a direct answer." 32 A witness may invoke the fifth amendment privilege
and refuse to answer questions that would either independently support a con-
viction or "furnish a link in the chain of evidence" needed to prosecute him.'33
In Hoffman, the petitioner appeared before the grand jury, but refused to
answer questions regarding the whereabouts of one Weisberg, a fugitive
witness, 134 on the ground that his answers might tend to incriminate him.
35
The district court found that Hoffman did not face a real threat of self-
incrimination and held him in criminal contempt. 36 Hoffman's conviction was
affirmed by the Third Circuit. 137 Reversing the conviction, 38 the Supreme Court
held that Hoffman had a reasonable basis for believing that his answers would
tend to incriminate him.' 39 The Court pointed out that, if Hoffman had
answered the questions, he might have linked himself to Weisberg and even
admitted to hiding Weisberg. 4 0 Thus, the Court concluded, Hoffman "could
reasonably have sensed the peril of prosecution ... "I'll
129. See United States v. Fox, 721 F.2d 32, 39 (2d Cir. 1983) ("compelled production of
records in a taxpayer's possession-even records prepared by a third party-implicitly authen-
ticates the records as the taxpayer's own and thus violates the Fifth Amendment").
130. See supra notes 128-29.
131. 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
132. Id. at 486.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 481.
135. Id. at 482.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 484.
138. Id. at 490.
139. Id. at 488.
140. Id. at 487-88. The Supreme Court noted that if Hoffman answered the questions he
would have faced the prospect of providing information that may have incriminated him in the
offenses of obstruction of justice as weil as the offenses that the grand jury was actively investigating.
Id. at 488-89.
141. Id. at 488. In United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115 (1980), the Court stated the
standard in somewhat different language. " 'The central standard for the privilege's application
has been whether the claimant is confronted by substantial and "real," and not merely trifling
or imaginary, hazards of incrimination.' "445 U.S. at 128, quoting, Marchetti v. United States,
390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968). Notwithstanding the difference in language between the two opinions,
Apfelbaum has not had any substantive impact on Hoffman. See United States v. Zappola, 646
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Under the Hoffman standard the trial court judge is responsible for deter-
mining whether the apprehension is reasonable. 142 In making this determina-
tion, the test is not whether the witness will be prosecuted, but whether he
could be prosecuted. 43 As the Seventh Circuit has held, "when a witness can
demonstrate any possibility of prosecution which is more than fanciful he has
demonstrated a reasonable fear of prosecution sufficient to meet constitutional
muster."' 4 Applying this standard, the court vacated and remanded a con-
tempt citation against a corporate officer who invoked the fifth amendment
in a private antitrust action after having pleaded nolo contendere to an indict-
ment charging a price-fixing conspiracy in the folding carton industry from
1960 through 1974.'4 Plaintiffs in the private antitrust suit assured the court
that they would restrict their deposition questions to the period alleged in the
indictment. On this basis they argued that any answers the witness might give
could not possibly form the basis for subsequent criminal charges, since the
witness had already been prosecuted.' 4 6 The court rejected this argument, stating
that the witness' answers could be used against him in a state prosecution
or as "other crimes" evidence in a federal prosecution covering post-1974
events.'47 In another private antitrust action, the Seventh Circuit held that
a witness who testified before a grand jury under a grant of use immunity
may nonetheless invoke the fifth amendment at a subsequent civil deposition
in response to questions that tracked those asked in the grand jury. 48 The
court reasoned that the witness' answers to the deposition questions constituted
a new source of evidence not derived from the previously immunized testimony
and that such answers could be used against the witness in a subsequent criminal
prosecution.' 4 9 On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, without reaching the
issue of whether a mere possibility of prosecution sufficed to meet the Hoff-
man standard.' 50 The Court's affirmance of the Seventh Circuit, however,
suggests at least tacit approval for a broad reading of Hoffman.
F.2d 48, 52-53 (2d Cir. 1981) (combining the two standards into one). Likewise in Doe, the Court
cited both Apfelbaum and Marchetti in determining whether the documents in question were
incriminating. Doe, - U.S. at - n.13, 104 S. Ct. at 1243 n.13.
142. Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486 ("It is for the court to say whether his silence is justified
... and to require him to answer if 'it clearly appears to the court that he is mistaken.' Temple
v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 892, 899 (1881)").
143. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
144. In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation (Appeal of Brown), 609 F.2d 867, 871 (7th
Cir. 1979); accord In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation (Appeal of Conboy), 661
F.2d 1145, 1151 (7th Cir. 1981), aff'd sub nom., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248 (1983);'
In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation (Appeal of Franey), 620 F.2d 1086, 1092 (5th
Cir. 1980).
145. In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation (Appeal of Brown), 609 F.2d 867, 873 (7th
Cir. 1979).
146. Id. at 871.
147. Id.
148. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation (Appeal of Conboy), 661 F.2d 1145,
1159 (7th Cir. 1981).
149. Id. at 1155.
150. See Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248 (1983).
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Nonetheless, some courts have taken an exceedingly narrow view of what
constitutes an incriminating question.' Although Judge Learned Hand
criticized this view even before Hoffman was decided,"5 2 it has persisted in
some courts.' 53 These courts put the witness in a conundrum. In order to prove
the incriminating nature of the questions, the witness may very well have to
disclose the very information that the privilege permits him to withhold. On
the other hand, if the witness refuses to make such a proffer, or makes only
a limited proffer, he risks being held in contempt on the grounds that he has
refused to answer non-incriminating questions.
In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Galante)'" illustrates this dilemma. In that
case, the grand jury sought to question Galante, a reputed leader of organized
crime, about whether he had presided at an underworld arbitration to resolve
conflicting claims to certain stolen property.' The prosecutors did not offer
Galante immunity, and he refused to answer questions before the grand jury.'
56
The pr6secutors sought a court order compelling Galante's testimony.,5 7 They
informed the court that they had no intention of prosecuting Galante for his
actions and disavowed any belief that he had violated any criminal laws.'
5
Galante nonetheless failed to make a showing to the judge of the specific
reasons why he feared his testimony would be incriminating. 5 9 The district
court judge held Galante in civil contempt, finding that his invocation of the
fifth amendment was capricious.
60
The Fifth Circuit reversed.' 6' The court stated that it could not conclude
that Galante was clearly mistaken in believing he had reasonable cause to fear
incrimination. 62 The court reasoned that answering questions about the under-
world arbitration might lead to evidence that Galante had received a share
of the stolen property as a "fee" or that he had otherwise violated federal
law.' 63 Under such circumstances, the court stated, an in camera proffer was
151. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Galante), 562 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam) (reversing a district court that had taken this position).
152. United States v. Weisman, 11 F.2d 260, 262 (2d Cir. 1940) (Hand, J.) ("Obviously
a witness may not be compelied to do more than show that the answer is likely to be dangerous
to him, else he will be forced to disclose those very facts which the privilege protects."). Judge
Walter R. Mansfield of the Second Circuit has recalled arguing this case as a young prosecutor
before Judge Hand. During his argument, in which he took the position that a witness could
be held in contempt for refusing to answer a non-incriminating question, Mansfield heard Judge
Hand mutter to himself, "Rubbish." Mansfield, The Lesson of Learned Hand, 68 A.B.A. J.
172, 172 (1982).
153. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
154. 562 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
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unnecessary.' 64 The court also noted that the prosecutors' assurance that they
would not use Galante's testimony against him provided no guarantee what-
soever that the testimony would not be used against him by other federal
prosecutors.1
65
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Galante clearly represents the proper way
of resolving the witness' dilemma. Particularly when a witness has been warned
of his fifth amendment rights (as is the case in an SEC investigation), he has
every reason to believe that his testimony will be used against him. Even seem-
ingly innocuous questions may provide links in a chain of evidence against
a witness.' 66 Even if the witness' answers are not incriminating at the time
they are given, they may turn out to be incriminating when considered in light
of subsequently obtained evidence or when evaluated by a different
prosecutor. 7
A federal judge is generally ill-equipped to make a determination whether
a particular question calls for an incriminating answer. The judge is generally
unfamiliar with the investigation and does not know either the evidence the
prosecutor has accumulated or the prosecutor's theories. Likewise, the judge
does not know what would be the substance of the witness' testimony. To
remedy this lack of information, judges sometimes hold an in camera hearing
at which the witness must explain to the judge his reasons for asserting the
privilege. This procedure was used in Feig v. Computer Microfilm Corp.'6
In that case, the plaintiff, who asserted a cause of action under rule lOb-5,
sought to depose one of the defendants, who refused to answer, claiming the
privilege against self-incrimination. 69 The court held an in camera hearing
and found that the defendant had a right to assert the privilege regarding all
questions concerning the events charged in the complaint because of the
possibility of future criminal prosecution. 7 The court noted that the defen-
dant had previously settled with the SEC in a case involving the same issues
as the plaintiff's case and that the SEC consent decree did not prohibit the
Commission from referring the matter for criminal prosecution.' 7'
Although the in camera hearing provides one means of permitting the
judge to decide whether the witness has properly invoked the privilege, this
procedure is still flawed in that it forces the witness to disclose at least partially
the very information that the privilege is designed to protect. This runs con-
trary to the teaching of Hoffman. 72 The better practice is for the court to
164. Id.
165. Id. at 335-36.
166. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
168. [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 99,218 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
169. Id. at 95,890.
170. Id. at 95,891.
171. Id.
172. See Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486 ("if the witness... were required to prove the hazard
in the sense in which a claim is usually required to be established in court, he would be compelled
to surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee").
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presume that the invocation of the privilege is proper and to permit the witness'
counsel to explain the risks of incrimination faced by the witness. 73 The court
should require no more than a minimal showing from counsel. Evidence that
the witness has been called before a grand jury or the SEC and warned of
his rights should be considered sufficient to justify invocation of the privilege.
Although this standard may well permit witnesses to frustrate discovery
by plaintiffs in civil cases,17 4 it is nonetheless the only way to protect adequately
the fifth amendment rights of a witness who has not been granted immunity.'"
If the Commission desires to obtain the testimony of a witness who has
announced his intention to assert the privilege, it should seek immunity for
the witness,'" as the Justice Department routinely does in civil antitrust cases.'"
II. THE ADVISABrLITY OF ASSERTING
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT IN AN SEC INVEsTIGATION
A. Strategic Considerations
Assuming that the privilege against self-incrimination is available, counsel
must then consider, as a tactical matter, whether to advise his client to assert
the privilege. The most obvious advantage of refusing to testify on constitu-
tional grounds is that the witness thereby avoids incriminating himself.'
7
1
The tactical effectiveness of asserting the privilege will vary from case
to case. In certain types of cases, where there is generally a lack of documen-
tary evidence or witnesses other than the targets (such as insider trading cases),
it is possible that, if the witness invokes the fifth amendment, the staff will
not have sufficient evidence to bring a public enforcement proceeding. In these
types of cases, the negative ramifications of invoking the privilege are minimal.
By contrast, in cases involving false or misleading disclosure by an issuer or
seller, the implications of asserting the privilege are more worrisome, because
it likely results in the staff placing a more sinister interpretation on the
documents and testimony it obtains from other sources.
173. See Heidt, The Conjurer's Circle-The Fifth Amendment Privilege in Civil Cases, 91
YALE L.J. 1062, 1073 (1982).
174. Id. at 1071-75.
175. Id. at 1074-75 ("responses providing clues need to be protected to keep the privilege
meaningful. Putting greater burdens on the invoker may undermine the purpose of the privilege").
176. See 18 U.S.C. § 6004 (1982) (administrative agencies may, with approval of Attorney
General, immunize witnesses who have asserted their privilege against self-incrimination and whose
testimony is necessary to public interest).
177. The Justice Department provides such immunity even though witnesses in antitrust
investigations are more frequently motivated in their refusal to testify by a desire to avoid pro-
viding harmful testimony against other witnesses than by a desire to avoid self-incrimination.
178. Invoking the privilege not only reduces the witness' exposure to substantive criminal
charges but also enables the witness to avoid being trapped into committing perjury. Cf. SEC
v. Geotek, 426 F. Supp. 715, 724 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (defendant pleaded guilty to one count of
violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001 in connection with filing of false affidavit with SEC); United States
v. Kline, 366 F. Supp. 994, 998 (D.D.C. 1973) (refusing to dismiss perjury indictment predicated
on false statements to SEC).
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By invoking the fifth amendment, the witness avoids having to testify at
a time when he does not know the dimensions of the Commission's case against
him. To be sure, the staff of the Commission's Division of Enforcement will
undoubtedly construe the invocation as an admission of guilt. At the conclu-
sion of the investigation, when the staff submits its enforcement memoran-
dum seeking authorization from the Commission to commence a public
enforcement proceeding, the staff will likely point to the invocation of the
fifth amendment as support for its recommendation that a public proceeding
be commenced. 179 On balance, however, the strategic advantage of not testi-
fying during the investigation substantially outweighs the disadvantages in a
case where it is likely that some enforcement proceeding would ultimately be
commenced in any event. Once the Commission brings an enforcement action,
the defendant can obtain discovery of the Commission's evidence prior to being
deposed. On the other hand, if an enforcement action is unlikely, then a witness
may well want to testify, since asserting the privilege in such circumstances
increases the chance he will be sued.
When the witness is a broker-dealer, counsel must also consider the
collateral consequences of invoking the privilege. Although the SEC, as a
government instrumentality, cannot punish an individual solely for invoking
the fifth amendment, 8 the stock exchange to which the broker-dealer belongs
may conduct a parallel investigation and terminate his membership if he refuses
to cooperate."'
179. Once the staff has decided to seek authority to bring enforcement proceedings, the
staff generally invites possible targets of a public enforcement proceeding to submit a statement,
commonly referred to as a Wells Submission, setting forth the reasons why an enforcement action
is inappropriate. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5310, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEc L. REP. (CCH) 79,010 (Sept. 27, 1972). The staff has incorrectly suggested that an individual
who has asserted his privilege against self-incrimination during the investigation is not entitled
to make a Wells Submission. The staff has also incorrectly suggested that it would construe the
receipt of the Wells Submission as a waiver of the privilege. There is no support for either of
these positions in any rule or regulation of the Commission. Furthermore, as a practical matter,
the Commission would review any submission received even if the staff felt that it had been
submitted inappropriately.
180. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 807-08 (1977) (state cannot divest
political party officer from state party position for asserting fifth amendment); Lefkowitz v. Turley,
414 U.S. 70, 82-83 (1973) (state cannot use threat of state contract cancellation to compel con-
tractor to waive fifth amendment); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497-98 (1967) (state
cannot compel waiver by threatening police officer with forfeiture of office); Spevack v. Klein,
385 U.S. 511, 516 (1966) (plurality opinion) (attorney may not be threatened with disbarment
as penalty for asserting privilege).
181. See, e.g., Richard Neuberger, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 18428, [1981-1982
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,091 (Jan. 19, 1982) (as self-regulatory agency,
the Exchange may impose sanctions government agency may not); In re Lawrence H. Abercrombie,
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15285, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RPn. (CCH)
82,342 (Oct. 18, 1979) (as self-regulatory organization, the National Association of Security
Dealers is not bound by same considerations that restrict government agencies). See also United
States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863, 867-71 (2d Cir. 1975) (because New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
is not agent of government, interrogation by NYSE of broker-dealer does not implicate fifth
amendment).
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B. The Possibility of an Adverse Inference
Assuming the witness is not subject to sanctions by a stock exchange for
claiming the privilege against self-incrimination, the primary risk the witness
takes in asserting the privilege during the investigation is that the Commission
will seek to have an adverse inference drawn in any subsequent enforcement
action. In support of its position that such an inference is justified, the Com-
mission relies on Baxter v. Palmigiano,82 which held that the fifth amend-
ment "does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when
they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against
them... "83 In Baxter, an inmate accused of inciting a prison disturbance
was informed that if he exercised his right to remain silent at a prison
disciplinary hearing, his silence could be used against him."' The inmate did
not testify at the hearing, and prison officials introduced several reports con-
taining the evidence against him. 85 After the hearing, the prison disciplinary
board placed the inmate in punitive segregation for thirty days.' 8 6 In upholding
the decision of the disciplinary board, the Court reasoned that unlike a criminal
case, "where the stakes are higher and the State's sole interest is to convict,"
disciplinary hearings "involve the correctional process and important state in-
terests other than conviction for crime."' 87 The Court also relied on the fact
that the assertion of the privilege was not the sole evidence supporting the
sanctions against the inmate. 8
Relying on Baxter, the court in SEC v. Musella " drew an adverse inference
against two defendants accused of insider trading who had invoked the fifth
amendment at their depositions and refused to produce documents. 9 The
court granted the Commission's motion for a preliminary injunction and a
freeze on assets, based in part on the adverse inference.'' The court began
its analysis with the observation that the defendants' ability to invoke the fifth
amendment put the Commission at a "potentially overwhelming disadvant-
age" in establishing its case. 92 Because of the nature of insider trading, the
182. 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
183. Id. at 318. See generally 8 J. Wi-moaR, EVIDENCE § 2272 at 439 (McNaughton rev.
ed. 1961).
184. 425 U.S. at 312.
185. Id. at 320 n.4.
186. Id. at 313.
187. Id. at 318-19.
188. Id. at 317-18.
189. 578 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
190. Id. at 429; see SEC v. Netelkos, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,607 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) ("the adverse inferences I draw from Netelkos' and Gamarekian's invocation of the Fifth
Amendment add credence" to the conclusion that they violated the securities laws); SEC v. Scott,
565 F. Supp. 1513, 1534 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("the negative inference which flows from Dirks' deci-
sion to remain silent, while not necessary to the Court's findings, provides further support for
the conclusion that he violated the securities laws"), aff'dper curiam sub nom., SEC v. Cayman
Islands Reins. Corp., 734 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1984).
191. See Musella, 578 F. Supp. at 445.
192. Id. at 429.
1984]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:895
court believed that assertion of the privilege could lead to a complete failure
of proof. 193 The court also expressed concern about the delays caused by the
assertion of the privilege, 19 apparently fearing that such delays would enable
the defendants to dissipate assets.1 95 The court stated that, if an indictment
had been returned, an adverse inference would be far less appropriate, because
of the possibility of prosecutorial abuse. 96 But the court was willing to allow
the inference when the defendants were only targets of an ongoing grand jury
investigation.97
Neither Baxter nor Musella holds that a witness who invokes the fifth
amendment during an SEC investigation is thereby subject to an adverse
inference. Nor is such an inference justified. An SEC investigation is not an
adversarial proceeding like the civil action in Musella or the prison disciplinary
hearing in Baxter. In this regard it more closely resembles the secret, exparte,
non-adversarial investigation conducted by a grand jury. 9 This distinction
is significant, because the propriety of drawing an adverse inference depends
on the existence of an adversary hearing. As one commentator has explained,
It is not the defendant's claim of the privilege, but his silence in the
face of other uncontradicted, adverse evidence which is damaging.
That is, as a party to the action, the defendant would be expected
to refute evidence contrary to his position, and if he fails to controvert
the plaintiff's testimony with facts within his control, such evidence
will be given conclusive weight. 99
Thus, adverse inferences should be permitted only when parties "refuse to
testify in response to probative evidence offered against them."20 Because
an investigative proceeding is non-adversarial, no evidence is "offered against"
a witness in such a proceeding; therefore, there is no need for a witness to
offer any evidence in response.
Moreover, it is important to remember that the SEC (like the grand jury)
gives Miranda-type warnings as a matter of practice to witnesses that appear
before it.2"' Having warned the witness of his fifth amendment rights, the
Commission cannot then fairly sanction him for asserting those very rights.
193. Id.
194. Id. The court did not identify these delays, but presumably they included the time spent
litigating the privilege issues and gathering evidence from sources other than the defendants.
195. See id. ("The objective [of the asset freeze], of course, is to ensure that defendants'
assets will remain available to satisfy any future court order to disgorge illegal profits.").
196. Id. at 430-31.
197. Id. at 431. Musella's distinction between a civil defendant who also faces a criminal
trial and one who is "only" a target of a grand jury investigation is unpersuasive. In both cases
the dangers of self-incrimination from testifying in the civil matter are particularly great. Both
situations give rise to the potential that prosecutors will engage in abusive practices.
198. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-44 (1974) (grand jury investigations
are ex parte, non-adversarial investigations).
199. Comment, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination In Civil Litigation, 1968 U. ILL.
L.F. 75, 79 (notes omitted).
200. Baxter, 425 U.S. at 318 (emphasis added).
201. The policy of the U.S. Department of Justice to give Miranda warnings to grand jury
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As the Supreme Court repeatedly has observed in recent years, Miranda
warnings assure the witness, at least implicitly, that his exercise of the right
to remain silent cannot be used against him.2"2 Consequently, a defendant
who remains silent after receiving Miranda warnings may not be impeached
at trial with this fact. 203 Nor may a defendant be impeached with the fact
that he invoked his fifth amendment rights when testifying before the grand
jury. 24 Given the close resemblance between an SEC investigation and a grand
jury investigation, courts likewise should refuse to draw an adverse inference
from the invocation of the privilege in an SEC investigation. 20
Further support for prohibiting an adverse inference in such circumstances
can be found in the law of evidence. The adverse inference rests on three
premises: (1) that invoking the privilege is equivalent to an admission of guilt;
(2) that such an admission is inconsistent with any subsequent exculpatory
testimony by the witness; and (3) that the exculpatory testimony may be
impeached with the prior inconsistent "statement" that the witness is asserting
the privilege. None of these premises is correct in the context of an SEC
investigation. As the Supreme Court has emphasized, "one of the basic func-
witnesses is set forth in 9 UNrrED STATES ATTORNEYs' MAruAL § 11.250. There is no manual
or rule memorializing the SEC's comparable practice.
202. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240 (1980); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976).
203. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976) (due process clause of fourteenth amend-
ment is violated when state prosecutor impeaches defendant with fact that he remained silent
after being arrested and given Miranda warnings); United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 181 (1975)
("it was prejudicial error for the trial court to permit cross-examination of respondent concern-
ing his silence during police interrogation" after having been warned of his rights). It may be
argued that Hale and Doyle, being criminal cases, are inapplicable in the civil context. And it
is true that in Baxter, the Court permitted an adverse inference even though the prisoner had
been warned of his right to remain silent. 425 U.S. at 317. However, in Baxter, the prisoner
also was told that his silence could be used against him. Id. This statement is not part of the
standard Miranda warnings. See Hale, 422 U.S. at 183 (White, J., concurring in judgment) ("Hale
was not informed here that his silence.., could be used against him at trial. Indeed, anyone
would reasonably conclude from Miranda warnings that this would not be the case.") Even if
the SEC were to begin warning witnesses that their silence could be used against them, or to
discontinue Miranda warnings altogether, an adverse inference would still be improper because
an SEC investigation is not an adversarial proceeding. See supra notes 198-200 and accompany-
ing text.
204. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 417, 424 (1957). In Grunewald, the peti-
tioner, Halperin, was called before a grand jury investigating corruption in the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. Id. at 416. Petitioner was asked, among other things, whether he knew certain employees
of the Bureau and whether he had delivered money to Grunewald as part of a tax-fixing scheme.
Id. In response, petitioner asserted the privilege. Id. At trial, he was asked many of the same
questions and answered them in a manner consistent with innocence. Id. at 416-17. On cross-
examination, the court allowed the prosecutor to elicit from petitioner the fact that he had invoked
the privilege in the grand jury. Id. at 417. Petitioner was convicted of obstructing justice, but
the Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 424.
205. Indeed, an adverse inference is arguably even less appropriate in the context of an SEC
investigation than in the context of a grand jury investigation. In a criminal case, the prosecutor
has only two opportunities to take the witness' testimony, once in the grand jury and once at
trial. In an SEC case, by contrast, the Commission has three chances to obtain a witness' testimony,
once during the investigation, once at the deposition, and once at trial. Thus, the Commission
has less need for the adverse inference than the prosecutor.
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tions of the privilege is to protect innocent men. ' 2 0 6 Innocent men as well
as guilty ones invoke the privilege, and it is therefore improper to equate its
assertion with an admission of guilt.20 7 Thus, for example, one who purchases
stock in a company shortly before a tender offer is announced may well be
reluctant to testify, even if he did not make his purchase on the basis of inside
information. In short, the invocation of the privilege has no probative value.2"'
Because this is so, there is no inconsistency between asserting the privilege
in an SEC investigation and later testifying that one is innocent.
Moreover, permitting the finder of fact to draw an adverse inference from
the witness' invocation of the privilege on a previous occasion arguably con-
stitutes an impermissible burden on the witness' constitutional rights. As Justice
Black stated, "The value of constitutional privileges is largely destroyed if
persons can be penalized for relying on them. ' 20 9 In Black's view, it was "in-
congruous and indefensible" for courts to infer lack of honesty from the in-
vocation of the privilege. 210 Similarly, in Frierson v. McIntyre,21' the court
refused to allow the plaintiff to introduce in evidence a deposition in which
the defendant had asserted her fifth amendment privilege, reasoning that
admission of the deposition would, in effect, deny the defendant her constitu-
tional privilege.2"2 There is also ample authority from state courts supporting
this theory."1 3 Although Baxter found no undue burden from permitting the
206. Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 421 (emphasis original); see Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n,
378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) ("the privilege, while sometimes 'a shelter to the guilty,' is often 'a protec-
tion to the innocent.' ").
207. Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 421.
208. Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc); see Doyle, 426
U.S. at 617 (silence is "insolubly ambiguous"); Hale, 422 U.S. at 177 ("failure to offer an
explanation during the custodial interrogation can as easily be taken to indicate reliance on the
right to remain silent as to support an inference that the explanatory testimony was a later fabrica-
tion"); United States v. Marquez, 319 F. Supp. 1016, 1022 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (Weinfeld, J.) ("The
invocation of the fifth amendment... is without probative value on the issue of the defendant's
guilt or innocence, and neither the prosecution nor the defense should be permitted to comment
thereon.").
209. Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 425 (Black, J., concurring). Justices Brennan and Douglas and
Chief Justice Warren joined Justice Black's opinion.
210. Id. at 426.
211. 151 F. Supp. 5 (W.D. Va. 1953).
212. Id. at 7.
213. See Walton v. Robert E. Haas Construction Corp., 259 So.2d 731, 734 (Fla. Ct. App.
1972) ("The admission of the prior exercise of the self-incrimination privilege would tend to destroy
or chill the exercise of such a right."), cert. denied, 265 So.2d 48 (Fla. 1972); Hall Motor Freight
v. Montgomery, 212 S.W. 2d 748, 751 (Mo. 1948) (defendant in wrongful death action arising
out of automobile collision could not be cross-examined at trial concerning his refusal to testify
in earlier criminal case concerning same collision; permitting cross-examination "would be a gross
impairment of the constitutional right, because it would burden it with a dangerous consequence");
accord Muir v. Grier, 325 P.2d 664, 669 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958) (same); Barnhart v. Martin, 64
N.E.2d 743 (IlI. App. 1945) (same). See also Loewenherz v. Merchants' & Mechanics' Bank,
87 S.E. 778, 780 (Ga. 1916) (in suit to determine ownership of property, "a party should not
be subjected to injury for availing himself of the privilege of refusing to answer questions which
might have a tendency . . .to [inicriminate him"); In re Woll, 194 N.W.2d 835, 840 (Mich.
1972) (in bar disciplinary proceeding, counsel for state bar could not comment on fact that defen-
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inference in civil cases, this ruling should not govern in the specialized context
of an SEC investigation.
Accordingly, in a situation where a defendant invokes the privilege dur-
ing the SEC's investigation, and then fully testifies in a subsequent civil deposi-
tion, no adverse inference should be permitted from the assertion of the
privilege. The civil deposition will occur only after the defendant has had an
opportunity to obtain discovery from the SEC. In a situation where the defen-
dant attempts to testify at trial after having invoked his fifth amendment right
during the SEC investigation and in the civil deposition, the court appears
to have two alternative courses of action. First, the court can allow the defen-
dant to testify, but permit an adverse inference based upon the earlier invoca-
tion of the privilege in the civil deposition. However, the better practice would
be to adjourn the trial and permit the taking of the defendant's deposition
and any additional discovery." 4
III. PROCEDURE FOR INVOKjNG T=E FI= AM rENDmN
IN AN SEC INVESTIGATION
Given the impropriety of drawing an adverse inference from the assertion
of the privilege during the SEC investigation, the Commission should follow
the practice adhered to by United States Attorneys in conducting grand juries.
Under this practice, a target will be excused from appearing before the grand
jury if he and his counsel inform the government that he intends to assert
the privilege." 5 Such a practice saves the government the time and expense
of making a fruitless effort to obtain the witness' testimony, and saves the
witness travel expenses and the humiliation of having to assert his constitu-
tional right before the grand jury.2 16 The factors favoring this policy apply
with equal force in the context of an SEC investigation.
dant asserted fifth amendment privilege and then subsequently changed his mind and answered
question).
214. See Rakoff, Taking the 5th in Civil Cases-Perils and Palliatives, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 8,
1983, at 4 ("if [the witness] invokes his fifth amendment [rights] during his deposition and thereafter
offers to testify at trial, he may find either that he is precluded from so testifying or that the
trial is adjourned until after his deposition can be taken"). Cf. Meyer v. Second Judicial District
Court, 591 P.2d 259, 261, 263 (Nev. 1979) (upholding order that witness not be permitted to
testify at child custody hearing unless she first answered questions as to which she had asserted
privilege during her deposition). In an SEC enforcement proceeding, there is no right to a jury
trial. As a practical matter, it is very difficult to screen the court completely from the fact that
the defendant invoked the privilege during the administrative investigation.
215. See 9 UN=rD STATES ATxroimuys' MA~uAL § 11.254 ("if a 'target' of the investigation
and his attorney state in a writing signed by both that the 'target' wil refuse to testify
on fifth amendment grounds, the witness ordinarily should be excused from testifying .... ").
Similarly, the courts have recognized that a witness who has stated his intention to invoke the
privilege may not be subpoenaed by the grand jury for the sole purpose of forcing him to take
the fifth amendment before the grand jury. United States v. Horowitz, 452 F. Supp. 415, 418
(S.D.N.Y. 1978). See In re Possible Grand Jury Investigation, 17 Cau. L. REP. (BNA) 2398
(D.D.C. June 25, 1975) (quashing subpoena). See also Jones v. United States, 342 F.2d 863 (D.C.
Cir. 1964) (en banc) (questioning propriety of summoning a target).
216. The practice of calling a witness whom the examiner knows will probably assert the
privilege is also inappropriate because it raises serious ethical questions. The ABA Criminal Justice
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However, because the Commission continues to take the position that an
adverse inference may be drawn, it insists that even those witnesses who have
announced their intention to rely on the privilege appear and testify. Under
such circumstances, the following alternative procedure, which the staff has
been agreeable to, is recommended. Prior to the witness' appearance, counsel
should inform the Commission of his client's intention to assert the privilege.
Counsel should then request that the Commission limit its questioning to avoid
wasting the time and financial resources of all parties. The Commission has
in the past been willing to limit itself to asking a question or two about each
of the subject areas of its investigation. The witness, for his part, should answer
the first few questions, which usually pertain to such matters as his name and
address, and should then assert the privilege for all other questions. 2 7 In assert-
ing the privilege, the witness need not say that he is refusing to answer because
an answer would tend to incriminate him. All he should say is that he is rely-
ing on his constitutional privilege and that he cannot be obliged to be a witness
against himself. 218 Counsel should not permit questioning as to whether the
witness is relying on his privilege because a truthful answer would tend to
incriminate him. Nor should counsel permit the questioning to go on for too
long a time.
CONCLUSION
The self-incrimination clause of the Constitution provides an important
protection which can be used effectively by the subject of an SEC investiga-
tion. By invoking the fifth amendment privilege during an SEC investigation
without the threat that at a later time an adverse inference will be drawn,
the defendant and counsel can decide the best course for defense of the SEC
case at a later time when more information is available.
Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function § 3.6(e) state that a prosecutor "should not com-
pel the appearance of a witness whose activities are the subject of the inquiry if the witness states
in advance that if called he will exercise his privilege not to testify. .. ." The District of Columbia
Bar Committee on Legal Ethics has stated that summoning a witness who has made clear that
he will invoke the privilege against self-incrimination violates DR7-106(C)(2) of the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility, which prohibits an attorney from asking "any question that he has no
reasonable basis to believe is relevant to the case and that is intended to degrade a witness ......
D.C. Bar Committee on Legal Ethics, Op. No. 31. In the view of the Committee on Legal Ethics,
forcing a witness to assert his privilege against self-incrimination "degrades" him. Id. at 4. Moreover,
the question is irrelevant since the examiner knows in advance that it will not be answered. Id.
at 4-5. Significantly, the Committee on Legal Ethics reached this conclusion outside the context
of a criminal case. The Committee applied its ruling to an attorney for a congressional committee
that had sought to compel a witness who had stated his intention to assert the privilege to do
so at a television hearing. Id. at 1.
217. See Heidt, supra note 173, at 1074 n.50 ("a stringent waiver rule holding that one who
provides facts waives the privilege as to details encourages invoking at the earliest opportunity").
218. See Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955) ("a claim of the privilege does
not require any special combination of words").
